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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses the socio-demographic characteristics of all Greek MEPs elected to 
the European Parliament in the nine European elections from 1981 to 2019. We present 
new data on Greek MEPs and explore whether the demographic characteristics of those 
elected after 2014 (when the method of selecting candidates changed) and their social 
and political capital are different from the attributes of the previous Greek political class. 
We then move on to explore the relationship between the national and the European 
parliaments, questioning the extent to which the European Parliament functions as a 
starting point for political careers in the national arena, and whether it serves as a field 
for the emergence of a ‘supranational elite’, with distinct characteristics from those of 
the domestic elite, or whether it is a form of golden retirement for the domestic elite. 
Based on the available data, we propose a typology of Greek MEPs and analyze the 
specific characteristics of each type.  
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Μια θέση για Βρυξέλλες: Απλή μετάβαση ή με επιστροφή; Προφίλ και τυπολογία των 
Ελλήνων Ευρωβουλευτών, 1981-2019 
 
ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ 
Στο άρθρο αναλύονται κοινωνικό-δημογραφικά χαρακτηριστικά των Ελλήνων/Ελληνίδων 
ευρωβουλευτών που εξελέγησαν στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο στις εννέα εκλογικές 
αναμετρήσεις από το 1981 έως το 2019. Εξετάζεται εάν μετά το 2014, όταν άλλαξε η 
μέθοδος επιλογής των υποψηφίων με την εισαγωγή του σταυρού προτίμησης, τα 
δημογραφικά χαρακτηριστικά των εκλεγμένων και το κοινωνικό και πολιτικό τους 
κεφαλαίο διαφέρουν σε σχέση με αυτά των ευρωβουλευτών/τριών που είχαν εκλεγεί τα 
προηγούμενα χρόνια. Εξετάζεται, επίσης, η σχέση ανάμεσα στο Εθνικό και το Ευρωπαϊκό 
Κοινοβούλιο και, ειδικότερα, α) σε ποιο βαθμό  το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο λειτουργεί ως 
σημείο εκκίνησης για την πολιτική σταδιοδρομία των ευρωβουλευτών/τριών στην εθνική 
πολιτική σκηνή, β) εάν χρησιμεύει ως πεδίο για την εμφάνιση "υπερεθνικών ελίτ" με 
διακριτά χαρακτηριστικά από εκείνα των εγχώριων ελίτ ή γ) εάν είναι μια μορφή πολιτικής 
αποστρατείας για τις εθνικές ελίτ. Με βάση τα διαθέσιμα δεδομένα, προτείνεται  μια 
τυπολογία της καριέρας προς το/στο Ευρωκοινοβούλιο και αναλύονται τα ιδιαίτερα 
χαρακτηριστικά κάθε επιμέρους τύπου.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the paths and the profiles of the political personnel who gained 
seats in the European Parliament (EP) from 1981 to 2019. In particular, the demographic 
and party profiles of politicians who moved to passed through or ended their careers in 
the EP are mapped to detect trends, dynamics, and developments in the domestic political 
system. The process for selecting this political personnel as candidates for the EP and the 
way this changed over time, the social and political capital of the candidates, their 
trajectories, and their relationship with the national parliament in general, are crucial 
aspects and functions of the political system. 
The examination of both the political trajectory and the paths of Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) allows us to distinguish certain patterns. These patterns 
reflect the different strategic choices of the political actors, that is, the different 
‘utilizations’ of the EP during a political career. In some cases, election to the EP paves 
the way for entry into the national parliament, by providing strong symbolic, cognitive, 
and political resources. In others, a term in the EP signals the entry into a European or 
supranational political elite that operates with an inner logic beyond – or with relative 
autonomy from – the national political competition. In yet others, it is a temporary 
solution to serve party needs in a given situation or on retirement and exit from 
(domestic) politics. 
The study of the complex routes of political personnel towards or through the EP 
allows us to formulate a typology. The proposed typology functions as a tool for further 
analysis and does not result from the exhaustive examination of a large amount of 
empirical data. On the one hand, the available data do not allow for the formulation of a 
typology with strong empirical verification that is capable of being generalized. On the 
other hand, the paths of political personnel are determined by multiple factors, a 
condition that is only partially addressed in the present work. As has already been noted, 
the main point of reference is the term of office of the political personnel in the EP. 
However, these limitations do not diminish the importance of the proposed typology, 
which follows the concept formation approach in which the concept is first built and then 
measured (Sartori, 1970).  
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Further, this paper aims to contribute to the significant and growing research on 
the profiles and career patterns of members of European elites (Cotta, 2018, pp. 650-651) 
by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the profiles and circulation patterns of Greek 
MEPs in the last four decades. It follows the socio-demographic approach to the study of 
elites (Gaxie, 2018), which originates from the classic notion of descriptive 
representation (Pitkin, 1967), and it uses an approach that combines the analysis of the 
micro-level (political trajectory and careers of MEPs) with that of the macro-level (the 
structure and dynamics of the national political system). First, the main socio-
demographic characteristics of all Greek MEPs ever elected to the European Parliament 
are presented. Second, their entry and exit paths are analyzed, with an emphasis on the 
specific socio-demographic and ideological characteristics that accompany each path.    
 
2. PROFILES AND CAREERS AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:  
STATE OF THE ART 
The European Parliament represents the will of the European people and plays a 
significant political role, especially after the 2004 enlargement, which was a ‘critical 
juncture’ for the EU institutions (Verzichelli and Edinger, 2005). These elements, 
together with the accumulated institutional experience of the European Parliament and its 
contribution to European integration, make the EP an attractive political destination, and 
this has a twofold effect. On the one hand, the EP intensifies the process of the 
professionalization of MEPs, because of the technocratic knowledge and know-how 
required. On the other hand, it contributes to the formation of supranational political 
elites that are connected with, but distinct from, individual national political elites 
(Salvati, 2016; Whitaker, 2014).  
Most pieces of research on MEPs focus on their socio-demographic or political 
profiles, but some study the patterns of their recruitment and political careers, either 
before or after serving in the EP. Verzichelli and Edinger (2005) consider MEPs from a 
macroscopic perspective and detect different recruitment and career patterns. They 
identify trends and characteristics that mark out MEPs as a separate and relatively 
coherent political class, namely, as a supranational elite with features that go beyond the 
individual national framework. Examining the relationship between the terms of MEPs in 
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the EP and their prior or subsequent political careers, Scarrow (1997) distinguishes three 
types of political career patterns: a) a term in the European Parliament to facilitate a 
career at the national level; b) a term in the European Parliament as a form of ‘political 
dead-end’ for those who either retire or take a non-elective post at the end of their term; 
and c) a supranational elite, with a term in the European Parliament as an end in itself. 
Scarrow’s data from the first decade of the EP suggested that European careers might be 
on the rise. Edinger and Fiers (2007) connect the previous policy experience of MEPs (an 
objective dimension) with their ambitions and aspirations formed during their tenure (a 
subjective dimension) and offer a comprehensive typology. Although they do not test 
their typology with data, they distinguish between six ideal types, each one reflecting a 
different kind of career path.  
Regarding the new Member States, evidence on MEPs from central Europe shows 
that ten years after the 2004 enlargement, experience at the national level remained 
relevant for most central European MEPs (Bíró-Nagy, 2019). Other researchers have 
linked political trajectories with how legislators cognitively conceive their roles (Bale 
and Taggart, 2006; Navarro, 2012). Bale and Taggart propose four types of MEPs, each 
with a different role orientation: a) the European evangelists, who are committed to the 
European idea and especially the European integration process; b) the policy advocates, 
who are dedicated to specific policies and the satisfaction that their implementation 
brings; c) the constituency representatives, who emphasize those whom they represent 
(constituents, party, interest group, etc.); and d) the institutionalists, who treat the 
European Parliament as having a value in itself. In a similar vein, Navarro (2012) also 
distinguishes four ideal types of MEP: a) the specialists, who place particular emphasis 
on the decision-making process and emphasize the technical and practical aspects of their 
work; b) the animators, who dedicate themselves to the cause of European integration; c) 
the intermediaries, who aim to develop ties between the EU and the voters; and d) the 
outsiders, who are not satisfied with the course and operation of the EU and express this 
dissatisfaction in all directions.    
Although these typologies primarily rely on the role orientations at the 
supranational level, they do not overlook ties with national political and party systems. 
The research shows that, while the influence exercised on MEPs by national parties, 
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particularly those of small size, is decisive (Raunio, 2000), a group of supranational 
MEPs emerges, with specific career patterns. Two main analytical perspectives examine 
the link between national politics and MEPs. The first approach studies the individual 
political parties and their candidates, examining the control that the parties impose and 
the loyalty that the candidates show (Raunio, 2000). The second approach focuses on 
technical factors such as the electoral system, the individual weight of each Member State 
and the number of MEPs that it elects, and the time between national and EP elections; in 
sum, the structure of the opportunities presented for election (Daniel and Metzger, 2018; 
Farrell and Scully, 2007; Salvati, 2016).   
Concerning the Greek case, the research so far either indicates the absence of 
available data (Raunio, 2000) or presents a static picture in time, with the examination of 
only single terms of the EP. Greek MEPs sometimes score highly on belonging to the 
group of amateurs, that is, they are political personnel with no longstanding relationship 
with the EP (Salvati, 2016), while others appear relatively more experienced (Beauvallet 
& Michon, 2010). Information on Greek MEPs in various comparative works is also 
rather superficial; whenever these works cover an extensive period, their findings tend to 
describe differences and similarities between different countries rather than providing a 
systematic and in-depth analysis of these changes over time (Beauvallet-Haddad et al., 
2016). 
In summary, the literature on MEPs stresses their complex relationship with the 
national parliaments and their changing role over time. Although MEPs constitute a 
separate political class with distinct characteristics, at the same time the importance of 
national ties and domestic party competition cannot be overlooked. Further, the literature 
emphasizes the changing relationship between national and European elections, and the 
impact of ‘critical junctures’ on the career patterns, profiles, and roles of MEPs.  
 
3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN GREECE 
The European Parliament is made up of 705 members from the 27 EU Member States, 
elected by direct universal suffrage for five years. The distribution of seats between the 
Member States depends on the populations of the countries. The first European 
parliamentary elections were held in 1979, and Greece did not participate in these as it 
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joined the (then) EEC two years later (January 1981). At that time, the ruling New 
Democracy (ND) party decided to hold the European elections in Greece at the same time 
as the national elections (October 18, 1981). From January to October 1981, the national 
parliament appointed 24 MEPs to fill Greece’s seats in the European Parliament. Since 
October 1981, the European elections have taken place every five years.
1
 The number of 
seats distributed to Greece was initially 24; it rose to 25 in the 1990s, dropped down 
again after the 2004 enlargement to 22, and is currently 21 (Table 1).  
From 1981 until 2009 MEPs gained a seat depending on their list position on the 
fixed party ballot, based on the total number of votes the party received. The entire 
country formed a single constituency, with an electoral threshold, after 1994, of 3% of 
the vote.
2
 Although each political party followed different procedures for compiling this 
list, it is evident that the political leader had the last word. The candidate selection 
process changed before the 2014 EP elections when the ruling coalition introduced open 
lists with a personal preference vote.
3
 Regardless of the deeper reasons behind this 
decision, there is no doubt that it was a tactical maneuver against SYRIZA. The main 
objective was to reduce the upcoming electoral losses by mobilizing voters through the 
personal preference system, which can lead to a higher turnout (Carey and Shugart, 
1995). The parties introduced a personal preference list with twice the number of 
candidates (42) as the number of Greek seats in the European Parliament (21).
4
 
                                                          
1
 For an overview of the electoral behaviour in the European elections in Greece, see Teperoglou (2016). 
2 The 3% electoral threshold was introduced for the 1994 European Parliament Elections with L 
2196/1994.  
3
 The two political leaders of the government coalition (Prime Minister A. Samaras from ND and Deputy 
Prime Minister E. Venizelos from PASOK) suddenly announced a different election system, the same as 
the one used for national elections in Greece. It was a strategic choice of the above parties in the context of 
the general socio-economic and political environment of that time. The decision was framed as an 
indication of pluralism and the democratization of the candidate selection, as party leaders no longer held 
the ‘privilege’ of personally picking the names and forming the list with their desired ranking (see 
https://m.naftemporiki.gr/story/763685). However, for the opposition party (SYRIZA), the change was 
viewed as an attempt to reverse the imminent electoral defeat of the ruling coalition parties and shift the 
public agenda regarding the political character and message of the European elections (see 
https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/54685/Scholio-toy-Grafeioy-Typoy-toy-SYRIZA-schetika-me-th-
schediazomenh-allagh-toy-nomoy-gia-tis-eyrwekloges.html). 
4
 This significant change had direct implications for both the structure of the ballot and the characteristics 
required for a candidate to be able to compete in the elections. The degree of personal appeal that a 
candidate now needs to get elected became evident from the fact that in the 2014 European elections, 
Manolis Glezos, the candidate with the highest number of votes (466,902), was voted for by one out of 
every three SYRIZA voters. Five years later, in the 2019 European elections, Stelios Kymbouropoulos held 
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Table 1: Seats per party in the European Parliament 1981-2019 
 1981 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 
PASOK 10 10 9 10 9 8 8 2* 2** 
NEW DEMOCRACY 8 9 10 9 9 11 8 5 8 
KKE 3 3   2 3 3 2 2 2 
KKE ES. 1 1               
SYNASPISMOS/ 
SYRIZA     4 2 2 1 1 6 6 
KODISO 1                 
KOMMA 
PROODEYTIKON 1                 
EPEN.   1               
DHANA     1             
POL.AN.       2           
DIKKI         2         
LAOS           1 2     
ECOLOGISTS GREENS             1     
GOLDEN DAWN               3 2 
TO POTAMI               2   
AN.EL.               1   
ELLINIKI LISI                 1 
Number of seats in EP 24 24 24 25 25 24 22 21 21 
Number of parties 6 5 4 5 5 5 6 7 6 
Number of new MEPs 24 18 11 15 14 20 14 19 11 
Participation in elections 
(%) 78.84 77.17 84.50 71.24 70.25 63.22 52.63 59.33 58.69 
National elections in the 
same year 
Same 
day   
Same 
day     Before Before   After 
Candidate selection 
method 
Closed 
List 
Closed 
List 
Closed 
List 
Closed 
List 
Closed 
List 
Closed 
List 
Closed 
List 
Open 
List 
Open 
List 
*MEPs of Elia ** MEPs of Kinima Allagis.        
 
Regarding the electoral outcome of the European elections, they have often been 
dominated in Greece by the national context, with many serving as indicators for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the record number of 577,114 personal votes, attracting the personal votes of one in every three ND voters. 
See https://ekloges.ypes.gr/. 
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outcome of an upcoming national election (Teperoglou, 2016). The left-right divide that 
served as the main dividing line up until 2009 was partially substituted in 2014 with a 
pro-European/anti-European cleavage (ibid). As evident from Table 1, another significant 
change in 2014 was the fact that the ratio of seats per party dropped, as more parties 
gained one of the (fewer) EP seats. It is clear, therefore, that since European election 
results cannot be seen independently of the national context, MEPs’ profiles and career 
patterns can also not be analyzed independently of the national context. 
 
4. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our data contain information on certain socio-demographic and political variables for all 
Greek MEPs elected to the European Parliament in all nine European elections from 1981 
until 2019 (Table 1). Our method of data collection followed the guidelines adopted for 
the Socioscope project.
5
 The database contains 146 unique cases in the initial 
composition of the European Parliament and 210 MEPs in total, a number that includes 
all those elected for more than one term. Although a comparison between MEPs and MPs 
raises methodological considerations, in terms of both the actual N size and the different 
policy arena, whenever data are available and comparable we present them for both 
parliaments. In that way, we can compare the two populations when they had a different 
(1981–2009) and the same (2014–2019) method for selecting candidates. We check 
whether the observed trends are common to the two legislatures and, therefore, are 
suggestive of broader transformations in the profile of Greek political elites regardless of 
the political arena.  
In the first part of the article, we present the socio-demographic variables (sex, 
education, profession) for MEPs across time. In the second part of the article, we propose 
a typology of the Greek MEPs based on their relationship with the national parliament 
and present the profile of each cohort.  
Most specifically we address the following research questions: 
1. If the supranational elite approach applies, then we expect Greek MEPs to 
constitute a distinctive European elite. They should have socio-demographic 
                                                          
5
For reference, see: https://socioscope.gr/dataset/deputies/about 
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attributes that differentiate them from the domestic elite and should pursue their 
careers exclusively in the EP.   
2. If the critical junctures approach applies, then we expect changes in the socio-
demographic attributes and career paths of Greek MEPs at times that are critical, 
either at the European level (such as the 2004 EP) or the national level (such as 
the 2014 EP). 
Before presenting our data, we should be cautious with the way we interpret them. 
Bearing in mind that we have a small N, some changes over time may be the result of 
minor changes. We are aware of this caveat; however, we believe that it does not override 
the general trends observed.  
 
5. THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEPS:  
CHANGES OVER TIME 
Sex 
Between 1981 and 2019 (Table 2), out of the 146 unique individuals ever elected to the 
European Parliament, 24 were women (16.4%). In all those elected to the European 
Parliament (210, taking the initial composition of each period), the percentage is only 
slightly higher (17.1%). Given that the presence of women in politics in Greece is low, 
and, until the end of the 1980s, politics appeared to be ‘a male monopoly’ (Kakepaki, 
2016, p. 114), it comes as no surprise that all 24 MEPs appointed in January 1981 under 
the ND government were men. The under-representation of women hardly changed in the 
first European elections in October 1981, which were held on the same day as the 
national elections. In these elections, Ms. Titina Pantazi, the first female Greek MEP in 
the history of the institution, was elected by taking the last electable position from the 
PASOK ballot. In each of the following two elections (1984 and 1989), Greece elected 
two women. From 1994 until 2009, the percentage of women in the European Parliament 
was higher than the percentage of female national MPs, and it reached a peak in 2009 
when 31.8% of Greek MEPs were female. The difference between the national and the 
European Parliament suggests that a closed list may correct misrepresentation biases 
(Kakepaki, 2016, pp. 113-114). We can also assume that the European arena was a place 
for the leaders of the largest parties (PASOK and ND) to promote a more gender-
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balanced image of their parties. If the leaders had provided predominantly male closed 
lists, this would have undermined their efforts to portray their parties as pro-European 
and in line with core European values.  
With the adoption of personal preference voting in 2014, the percentages fall fully 
into line with those of the national parliament. This alignment leads to a significant drop 
in the proportion of women, from 31.8% in 2009 to 23.8% in 2014 and 2019. The 
literature suggests that when the entire electorate chooses candidates, it is much harder to 
coordinate and select candidates with the socio-demographic or ideological 
characteristics that are ‘desirable’ for each party (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). The findings 
from Greece confirm the hypothesis that the larger the ‘selectorate’, the less 
representative is the body that gets selected. Party leaders can now ‘blame the voters’ for 
the less gender-balanced outcome since the lists complied to the 1/3 gender quotas rule.  
 
Table 2: Gender distribution of MEPs and MPs 1981–2019  
 Women 
(Ν) 
Men 
(Ν) 
Women in the 
European 
Parliament 
(%) 
Women in the 
Greek 
Parliament* 
(%) 
Term 1 1981 1 23 4.2 4.3 
Term 2 1984 2 22 8.3 4.3 
Term 3 1989 1 23 4.2 4.0 
Term 4 1994 4 21 16.0 6.2 
Term 5 1999 4 21 16.0 10.5 
Term 6 2004 7 17 29.2 14.1 
Term 7 2009 7 15 31.8 19.1 
Term 8 2014 5 16 23.8 23.2 
Term 9 2019 5 16 23.8 21.3 
Total 36 174 17.1 11.9 
* Whenever elections were not in the same year, the percentage refers to the nearest national elections 
(source: socioscope.gr and Drettakis, 1991). 
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Education  
All research on elites suggests that the level of education of political elites is much higher 
than that of the general adult population, and this is probably one of the most significant 
discrepancies in descriptive representation. In the European Parliament, this 
disproportionality is even higher than in the national parliaments (Bovens and Wille, 
2017, p. 117). The increased complexity of the issues addressed at the supranational level 
requires competencies and expertise that are in line with advanced studies. At the same 
time, advanced education gives individual-specific life skills that are crucial in the EP 
(Daniel, 2015). It has been established that, in the Greek case, at least until 2009, 
members of the national parliament had high educational capital (Kountouri, 2016). 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of Greek MEPs who held a Master’s degree or higher, 
those with a university degree, and those without a university degree.  
   
Figure 1: Level of Education of Greek MEPs 1981–2019  
 
  
From Figure 1, we can distinguish three periods in the distribution of the 
educational level of the Greek MEPs. The first period is from 1981 to 1994, when the 
percentage of those who held a university degree was about twice that of those who held 
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a master’s degree or a PhD. The share of MEPs with less than tertiary education was low 
and, in some terms (1989, 1999, 2009), was zero.   
The second period, from 1999 to 2009, is a period when the share of those with a 
master’s degree or a PhD was equal to or exceeded the share of those with a university 
degree. The search for specialized expertise is fully compatible with the modernization 
rhetoric that dominated politics in this decade in Greece, under PASOK and in the person 
of K. Simitis, the chief inspirer and leader of the project. Both PASOK and ND, which 
was continually trying to reinforce its brand as the party that ‘owned’ and generally 
safeguarded Greece’s European course and prospects, kept this issue high on the agenda 
during the 1990s (Karayiannis, 2007). Both parties emphasized the need for policies that 
would align Greece with the European average for social and economic wellbeing and 
would help to integrate the country further in Europe.  
Finally, in the third and final period, 2014–2019, there was a drop in the 
educational status of the MEPs. The percentage of MEPs without a university degree 
more than doubled (to 19% in 2014 and 24% in 2019), and at the same time the 
percentage of holders of a master’s degree or a PhD significantly declined. As will be 
made clear below, this was also a result of a change in the occupational characteristics of 
the MEPs. In sum, open lists and changes in the party system worked in favour of the 
expansion and inclusion of social groups (in this case, the less well-educated) who were 
underrepresented in all aspects of representation. Of course, these trends come from small 
changes in absolute numbers, so they are quite volatile and are possibly susceptible to 
change.  
 
Professions 
The political profession is an area that has received extensive study, analysis, and 
classification, with an emphasis on developments at the macro-level (Best and Cotta, 
2000) and on the latest developments and transformations (Gaxie, 2018). In the case of 
Greece, there is an empirically established link between parliamentary representatives 
and the traditional professions of politicians, such as lawyers, doctors, and economists, 
and later, the so-called ‘mass audience and high public visibility’ professions of 
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journalists, artists, and athletes (Kakepaki and Karayiannis, 2016). Figure 2 shows the 
occupations of those elected to the European Parliament. 
 
Table 3: The professions of Greek MEPs, 1981–2019 (N)   
 EP 
1981 
EP 
1984 
EP 
1989 
EP 
1994 
EP 
1999 
EP 
2004 
EP 
2009 
EP 
2014 
EP 
2019 
Total 
Journalists 4 7 5 6 3 3 2 3 4 37 
Economists 6 2 6 5 7 3 4 1 3 37 
Lawyers 9 5 4 4 1 4 3 3 2 35 
Engineers 1 2 - 1 3 3 3 4 3 20 
University 
Professors 
1 2 2 2 4 2 2 1 - 16 
Doctors 1 4 2 3 2 - 1 - 1 14 
Managers/Top 
positions 
- 1 1 1 1 3 2 - 1 10 
Clerical Jobs - - 1 2 2 1 - 2 - 8 
Artists/athletes - - - 1 - - 1 2 3 7 
Teachers - - - - - 2 2 - - 4 
Armed forces - - - - - - - 2 1 3 
Other 2 1 3 - 2 3 2 3 2 18 
 
The first finding from Table 3 is that, in contrast to the national arena, the legal 
professions are not the leading profession after 1981. In contrast, journalists, economists, 
and other professionals became more widespread. The trend after 2000 for journalists to 
appear in the national legislature in higher numbers (Kakepaki and Karayiannis, 2016, p. 
94) was already evident at the European level, and here the numbers only began to 
decline in 1999, at the same time that they started to increase on the domestic scene. One 
plausible explanation for the popularity of the journalistic profession is that journalists, 
by the nature of their occupation, are more aware of and knowledgeable about the EU. 
Also, the EP became an attractive professional destination when one considers the 
changes in the media environment in Greece from the 1990s onwards 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2004).  
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After 2014 the occupational characteristics of Greek MEPs changed, and in the 
following ways, they largely followed the characteristics of the political personnel in the 
Greek parliament (Kakepaki, 2018): the election of personalities from professional 
backgrounds with a broad appeal throughout the electorate, such as artists and athletes; 
the gradual disappearance of professions of high status and technocratic expertise but not 
necessarily broad appeal (such as university professors); and, finally, the election for the 
first time of retired armed forces personnel (linked to the entry to the EP of the far-right, 
ultranationalist, and neo-Nazi Golden Dawn).  
 
6. TYPES OF CAREER IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 AND A PROPOSED TYPOLOGY 
In the second part of this article, we test the relationship between the national and 
the European Parliament. By tracking the career paths of MEPs not only before they enter 
the European Parliament, as is usually done, but also after they exit the EP, we create a 
typology based on the relationship between the national and the European Parliament 
(Figure 2). It is based on the dynamic relationships between the domestic political system 
and the EU as these are imprinted in the trajectories of the careers of the political 
personnel. The proposed typology, like most typologies, it is not based on an exhaustive 
number of cases but seeks to record relationships between and not properties of the 
single cases to which it refers.       
 
Figure 2: Types of careers of Greek MEPs 
 
Continue their career in 
national parliament after 
EP 
Do not continue their 
career in national 
parliament after EP 
Elected first to European 
Parliament 
Strategists Careerists  
Elected first to national 
parliament 
Party Soldiers Golden Parachutists  
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The two variables under consideration create a typology with four groups of 
MEPs. The first group contains those who are first elected at the European level, without 
any prior experience at the national level, and who then proceed to have a career in the 
national parliament. We call these Strategists, and we assume that they use the symbolic 
political capital and expertise of the European arena strategically as a stepping-stone for 
their political career in the national arena. The second group consists of those who are 
first elected to the EP and who remain there, ending their political career with a 
background only in the European Parliament. We call these Careerists. The third group 
contains those who are elected first to the national parliament, then move to the European 
Parliament and then return and continue their political careers in Greece. We call these 
Party Soldiers, since they do not seem to favour one level of policymaking over the 
other, and move with relative ease from the national to the supranational level, depending 
on the party’s needs. Finally, the fourth and last category is those who are first elected to 
the national parliament and who continue there and end their career in the European 
Parliament, since after leaving the EP they are not elected to another legislative body. 
These are members of the national political elite who use the European Parliament as a 
type of honorary retirement from their political career. We call them the Golden 
Parachutists. Table 3 shows the proportion of each category in all the EPs and the 
turnover rates for the EP. The general distribution of the types reveals that the dominant 
type of Greek MEP is the Careerist. Almost exactly half (50.5%) of all MEPs ever 
elected to the EP have had an exclusively European career. The second-largest type of 
MEP is the Golden Parachutists (27.1%), while Strategists are the third type (17.1%). 
The Party Soldier is a rather marginal type, with just 5.2% of all MEPs belonging to this 
group. Although this is the overall distribution, the relationship between the national and 
the European Parliament is not static and changes over time, as Table 4 further suggests.  
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Table 4: Turnover in the European Parliament and types of careers of Greek MEPs, 
1981–2019 (%) 
  Turnover Careerist 
Golden 
Parachutist 
Strategist 
Party 
Soldier
6
 
EP 1981 100.0 25.0 62.5 12.5 0 
EP 1984 85.7 33.3 41.7 20.8 4.2 
EP 1989 45.8 45.8 29.2 25.0 0.0 
EP 1994 62.5 64.0 16.0 16.0 4.0 
EP 1999 58.3 64.0 16.0 20.0 0.0 
EP 2004 83.3 45.8 8.3 29.2 16.7 
EP 2009 63.3 54.5 18.2 22.7 4.5 
EP 2014 90.5 66.7 19.0 4.8 9.5 
EP 2019
7
 52.4 57.1 33.3 - 9.5 
Total  50.5 27.1 17.1 5.2 
  
With a 100% turnover, the 1981 European Parliament is seen as the starting point 
for a new political class, since none of the 24 elected MEPs were among the 24 who had 
been appointed for the previous months. However, this new political class was novel only 
to the EU Parliament; the national parliament was the main pool, with 62.5% of those 
elected for the first time originating from there. In the first decade (1981–1989), the 
pattern that stands out is the declining supply of MEPs from the national parliament to 
the European Parliament. In 1989, 29.2% of MEPs had previously served in the national 
legislature, while 45.8% had served exclusively in the EP. At the same time, the 
Strategists were on the rise.  
In the next decade (1994–1999), the relationship between the European 
Parliament and the national parliament changed. The percentage of MEPs with a previous 
term in the National Assembly fell to 16% for both terms, indicating a relative autonomy 
                                                          
6
 Because of the small number in the Party Soldier category (only 11 cases out of 210), the percentages can 
only be indicative of certain trends. 
7
 Obviously, there is no way to guess the future status of a current MEP, so in another election they might 
belong to a different category, depending on their future career path. Therefore, the types for 2019 are 
suggestive and not final.  
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of the supranational political elite from the national one. In comparison, the percentage of 
Strategists also declined (to 16% and 20% respectively). It becomes clear that the 1990s 
was a period when a supranational elite, pursuing a career exclusively at the European 
Parliament, was gradually emerging, with 64% belonging to this type. During the same 
period, as noted in the previous section, we record the highest percentages for the 
educational capital of MEPs. This trend partly stopped in the next decade: in 2004, the 
rate of those coming from the national parliament remained low (8.3%), the percentage of 
Strategists more than doubled (29.2 %), while the percentage of Careerists fell to 45.8%.  
The period after 2014 has two points worth stressing. First, the turnover in 2014 
was the second-highest in the history of the European Parliament (90.5%), marking the 
starting point for a new generation of MEPs. Although the open lists may have worked in 
favour of the selection of completely different political personnel, we link this renewal to 
the reshaping of the party system after 2012, the decline of the traditional parties, and the 
rise of new parties, trends already evident in the national arena (Kakepaki, 2018, p. 103). 
Experience in the national parliament was again on the rise, as, especially in 2019 when 
33.3% belonged to the Golden Parachute type. We can assume that this marks a setback 
in the autonomy of the supranational field to produce political elites, as is suggested by 
the need for prior recognition required by the open list system. 
Moreover, members of the national elite may have found it harder to be re-elected 
to the national parliament due to changes in party competition, and therefore they were 
more willing to compete in the European arena. Finally, even without knowing the future 
positions for the 2019 cohort, we can see that the number of Strategists declined. We 
tentatively suggest that this might also reflect the de-legitimization of the EU and the 
rising unpopularity of EU-related personnel.  
Finally, Table 5 shows the different socio-demographic characteristics of the three 
major MEP types. The most frequent profession for Careerists is journalism; Careerists 
have a higher educational level than Golden Parachutists but the same education level as 
the Strategists. They do not come from political families (only 9.7% have a family 
tradition). They are elected to Parliament for the first time at the average age of 54 years, 
while at the symbolic level, measured by whether they head the list (or, after 2014, 
whether they attract the highest number of personal preference votes), only 16.8% of 
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them occupy the first place. It is also interesting to note that, although they have never 
competed in the national arena, 9.7% of them have held extra-parliamentary ministerial 
positions. In terms of their distribution between the major European political groups,
8
 
Careerists mostly belong to the two largest political groups, the European People’s Party 
(EPP) and the Socialists and Democrats group (S&D).  
 
Table 5: Types of Greek MEPs, socio-demographic and political* characteristics 
   
Careerist 
(Ν= 72) 
Strategist 
(Ν= 22) 
Golden 
Parachutist 
(Ν= 43) 
Most frequent occupation Journalist 
Economist/ 
Lawyer 
Lawyer 
Mean terms 1.4 1.6 1.3 
Mean age at 1
st
 election 54 44 57 
Women (%) 16.7 18.2 16.3 
ISCED 7/8 (%) 43.1 43.5 37.2 
Family tradition (%) 9.7 9.1 37.2 
Ministerial position (%) 9.7 63.6 39.5 
Top of the electoral list (%) 18.1 13.6 27.9 
Belong to the S&D 33.3 54.5 37.2 
Belong to the EPP 34.7 22.7 44.2 
Belong to the GUE/NGL 15.3 22.7 9.3 
Total (%) 49.3 15.2 33.3 
*The current names of the European political groups are used. Source: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/previous-elections (own calculations). 
 
The second type, Golden Parachutist, displays all the archetypal characteristics of 
the domestic political elite. Golden Parachutists are predominantly lawyers; they are 
                                                          
8
 We use the European political group to which the MEPs belong; in the case of New Democracy MEPs 
this is the group of the European People’s Party. For PASOK/ELIA/KINAL/POTAMI MEPs this is the 
group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament. For 
SYRIZA/SYN/DHKKI and KKE (until 2009) MEPs this is the Left group in the European Parliament. 
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elected to the European Parliament, on average, at an older age than the other types (57 
years), and remain there for the shortest time (1.3 terms). They disproportionately come 
from a political family (37.2%), with a past tenure as a minister (39.5%), and, since they 
are well-known political figures, they capitalize on this by being more likely than the 
others to head the list (27.7%). Their level of education is not as high as that of the other 
types, since their political capital stems from other factors. The majority in this group 
belong to the EPP (44.2%), with 37.2% belonging to the S&D and only 9.3% to the 
GUE/NGL group (the European United Left/Nordic Green Left).  
The third type, Strategists, differs significantly from the previous one in the 
following: Strategists are elected to the European Parliament at a much younger age 
(mean age at the first election is 44 years) and remain for a longer period (on average for 
1.6 terms). Their most common occupations are economists and legal professionals, 
while an exceptionally high percentage of this group (65.6%) occupy a ministerial 
position when returning to the national parliament. This is, in conclusion, a group of 
political figures for whom the European Parliament serves as a symbolic resource and a 
stepping-stone that is used on the way to the national political scene with a ministerial 
position. Finally, Strategists differ in their political affiliation, since they overwhelmingly 
belong to the S&D group (54.4%).  
Interestingly, the one thing that remains relatively unchanged across the three 
groups is the share of women MEPs, which ranges from 16.3% (Golden Parachutists) to 
18.2% (Strategists). We assume that, overall, the method of selection (closed lists), 
together with the particular emphasis on gender equality measures by the EP (e.g., 
quotas), made it difficult for parties to ignore women and promote men. Therefore, this 
made the European arena slightly more gender-equal than the national one.  
On the other hand, when it comes to their political affiliation, there are notable 
variations across the party groups: ND uses less of the political capital of its MEPs in the 
national context since they are more likely either to finish their career in the EP (as a 
Golden Parachutist) or to stay exclusively there. On the contrary, for 
PASOK/KINAL/ELIA politicians a career in Europe is used strategically to enable a 
national career. MEPs from the smaller parties of the left (those belonging to the 
GUE/NGL group) make up most of the Party Soldiers category (figures not shown), 
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suggesting that, for them, election to the EP is dictated by internal party needs and does 
not serve a personal career path so strongly.  
 
7. DISCUSSION 
Our first question, regarding the ‘supranational elite’ approach, is partly verified by our 
data. Greek MEPs display certain socio-demographic attributes that differentiate them 
from the domestic elites. Greek MEPs have (a slightly) more balanced distribution than 
MPs in the core socio-demographic variable of gender, have a higher educational and 
professional status, and predominantly pursue careers exclusively at the EP since more 
than half of them belong to the Strategist type.  
At the same time, these MEPs do not present a static image over time, suggesting 
that certain EP elections were critical. On the one hand, the critical juncture of the 2004 
EP elections brought to the fore a new generation of MEPs with a more ‘technocratic’ 
profile, as expressed in their higher educational capital; there was a better gender balance 
among them, and they came from more diverse professions. At the same time, these 
MEPs returned in larger numbers to the national arena as Strategists, suggesting that the 
2000s were a period in which, for the domestic party competition, a tenure in the EP was 
seen as an asset that would elevate one’s chance of election at a time when ‘project 
Europe’ was not a cause for major divisions.   
The critical juncture of 2014, and the emerging pro-European/anti-European 
cleavage in the elections for the EP, also seems to have had an impact on the profile of 
elected MEPs. After 2014 the percentage of women decreased, while the numbers of 
MEPs from non-traditional political professions, and those with lower educational levels, 
increased. New parties entered the EP, whilst a different selection process produced 
different results in the field of representation. The adoption of open lists possibly signaled 
a setback to the autonomy of the supranational political elites. Election to the European 
Parliament requires either political visibility, through a past term in the national 
parliament, or public recognition through personal and professional traits. We assume 
that this development was also related to changes in the content of the electoral 
competition and the rise of anti-European sentiment. 
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Our findings suggest that the study of the MEPs remains an open research subject. 
The socio-demographic characteristics of the MEPs and their profiles over time reflect 
broader political procedures. The study indicates how the political forces perceive the EU 
and the country’s role in it, and how the EU becomes a part of national political 
competition. The changes in the profiles of the MEPs also reflect a broader shift in 
western political systems, with the gradual dominance of communication mechanisms, 
and the media in general, in the political process. We can link these trends to the 
personalization of politics, that is, to the gradual predominance of the individual 
(politician) at the expense of the collective (political party, etc.) in the political process.  
Finally, it is important to underline the need for further analysis of the complex 
paths of the careers of political personnel. The types of Careerist, Party Soldier, and 
Strategist indicate the complex relationships between the national parliament and the EP. 
In addition, the type of Golden Parachutist indicates that there are complex relationships 
between the elites, that is, the national elite and the European one. These complex 
relationships are dynamic rather than static. They reflect the changing attitudes towards 
the European Union and its role in national policy, and different strategic choices made 
by political personnel in the context of the particular historical juncture. 
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